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Abstract 
Urbanisation has long been seen by scholars and policymakers as a disruptive process that can 
contribute to social and political unrest, yet there is little cross-national quantitative empirical 
research on the topic. In this paper we provide a comprehensive analysis of the links between 
urban geography and the incidence of protests (i.e. demonstrations, riots and strikes) in African 
countries since 1990. In contrast to previous studies, we are careful to distinguish between 
urban population scale effects, urban population ratio effects, population rate-of-change effects 
and urban population distribution effects.  We also provide an explicit test of the long-standing   Ǯ-ǯ      Ǥ  
negative binomial models that control for key political and economic variables we find that 
urban population size and the number of large cities in a country are both positively and    Ǥ  ǡ     ǯ  
urbanization is negatively associated with protest incidence and reject the over-urbanization 
hypothesis: higher levels of urbanization are associated with less frequent protests at all income 
levels. We find no evidence that the pace of urban population growth or urban primacy 
significantly influence protest mobilization. In sum, our results provide a nuanced picture of the 
relationship between urban geography and protest incidence that challenges conventional         Ǯ ǯ  Africa in 
particular, and developing countries more generally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The process of urbanisation has long been seen by scholars and policymakers as a disruptive 
process that can contribute to social and political unrest (see Huntington 1968; Cornelius 1969; 
Pye 1969; Hibbs 1973; Walton and Ragin 1990; Goldstone 2010). In his classic 1968 work 
Political Order in Changing Societies Samuel Huntington argued that ǲǳȋ2006 [1968], 299). 
More recently Jack Goldstone has identified urbanization in poor countries as one of the key Ǯ-ǯal security risks in the twenty first century, claiming ǲ
heavily urbanized, the more [poor countries] are likely to experience Dickensian poverty and  ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ?ȌǤ  this longstanding interest in the links between 
urbanization and civil unrest there has been little cross-national quantitative empirical research 
on the topic. In this paper we make a contribution to addressing this gap in the literature by 
examining the complex relationships between urban geography and protest mobilisation in 
African countries between 1990 and 2013. We focus on Africa for two reasons. First, countries 
across the continent have experienced the highest rates of urban population growth on average 
in the world in recent decades. Second, it is the only continent for which comprehensive, 
comparable and transparent national-level data on protest activity are available. 
Our analysis offers two contributions to the literature. First, we provide a comprehensive 
discussion and empirical investigation of the links between various aspects of urban geography 
and the likelihood of protests, including public demonstrations, riots and strikes. In contrast to 
previous studies of contentious collective action events such as protests, which often 
incorporate one or two urban demographic variables without controlling for others, we are 
careful to explicitly distinguish between urban population scale effects, urban population ratio 
effects, population rate-of-change effects and population distribution effects.  We also provide a 
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direct test of the long-   Ǯ-ǯ ȋǤǤ  
economic development) increases the likelihood of outbreaks of civil unrest. 
Our second innovation is the use of a multilevel modelling strategy that allows us to distinguish 
between a) the effects of changes in individual variables within countries over time, and b) the 
effects of variation in key explanatory variables across countries. This is in contrast to previous 
empirical studies, which generally employ a country fixed-effects approach. Fixed effects models 
only consider within country difference, and do not allow differences between countries to be 
considered, meaning their presentation of the processes at hand are always incomplete in 
comparison to our approach. 
Multilevel negative binomial models controlling for key political and economic variables show 
that urban population size and the number of large cities in a country are both positively and 
significantly associated with the frequency of protest events, as expected. Conversely, we find   ǯ          
incidence. We also reject the over-urbanization hypothesis (at least with regard to protest 
activity): interaction terms designed to explicitly test this hypothesis indicate that levels of 
urbanization are associated with less frequent outbreaks of unrest at every level of income. We 
find no evidence that the pace of urban population growth or urban primacy significantly 
influence the frequency of protest mobilization. In sum, our results provide a nuanced picture of 
the relationship between urban geography and protest incidence that challenges conventional 
wisdom and contemporary hyperbole about the dangers of rapid Ǯurbanǯ in Africa in 
particular, and developing countries more generally. This more nuanced perspective hinges on 
recognising the substantive difference between population ratio, scale, rate-of-change and 
distribution effects. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two reviews the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature on the links between urban geography and civil unrest. It also provides 
a cursory review of key political and economic variables associated with civil unrest. Section 
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three summarises the variables used in our models and describes our multilevel binomial 
estimation strategy. Section four summaries our key results and section five concludes. 
 
URBAN GEOGRAPHY & PROTEST MOBILIZATION: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
Existing literature on the causes of contentious collective action events such as protests offers a 
diverse range of theories which can roughly be grouped into four categories: grievance-based 
approaches, resource mobilization theory, political opportunity approaches, and modernization 
theory (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). In turn, these four broad approaches can be intuitively 
summarised as seeking to identify how the motives, means and opportunities for contentious 
collective action shape the frequency and intensity of events such as protests. 
Theoretically there are many ways in which the size and distribution of populations, as well as 
changes in these variables, may affect the motives, means and opportunities for collective 
mobilization. In order to provide a structured approach to analysing these relationships we 
distinguish between four separate types of effects: population ratio effects, population scale 
effects, rate of population change effects and population distribution effects.  
 
Urbanization and Ratio Effects   Ǯǯ             
related but distinct phenomena. As a result, it is conceptualised and operationalised in a variety 
of ways in empirical research. Here we use the term in the way it is deployed by professional ǣǯ ȋǮǯȌǡ   ȋǮǯȌǤHowever, the fact that many authors use the term in a more generic way 
to refer to the demographic growth and physical expansion of towns and cities can lead to some 
confusion about causal mechanisms. 
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Theoretically, the association be  ǯ     
collective action is ambiguous. From a resource mobilization perspective, population 
concent    Ǯ-ǯ costs associated with coordinating 
collective action thereby making it easier to organise a protest and hence increasing the 
probability of such an event (Sewell 2001; see also Walton and Ragin 1990; Glaeser and 
DiPasquale 1998; Herbst 2009; Staniland 2010; Wallace 2013). In more urbanized countries 
there may also be a lower probability of being detected or punished by a repressive political 
regime than in a less urbanized country, which might reduce the opportunity costs of 
participation. From a grievance perspective, population concentration creates challenges in 
terms of public goods delivery and the management of conflicts between diverse groups while 
at the same time bringing the prosperous and poor into close proximity and throwing 
socioeconomic inequality into stark relief (Huntington 1968; Cornelius 1969; Walton and Ragin 
1990; Blanco and Grier 2009; Goldstone 2010; Wallace 2014).  And from a modernization 
perspective, urbanization is traditionally associated with the emergence of a middle-class that is 
likely to agitate for enhanced political and economic rights or take to the streets to express their 
grievances (Huntington 1968; Reissman 1970; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).  Through these 
resource mobilization, grievance and social modernization mechanisms, we might therefore 
expect a country with a highly urbanized population to experience more protest events than an 
identical country with a lower level of urbanization. 
On the other hand, high levels of urbanisation could plausibly reduce the incidence of 
contentious mobilization. While population concentration creates challenges, it also yields 
economies of scale in the provision of public goods (thereby reducing grievances or motives for 
protest) and facilitates government monitoring and strategic repression, which can reduce 
opportunities for mobilisation and raises the costs of doing so (Herbst 2000; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Staniland 2010). Urbanisation can also encourage social integration and the 
emergence of a unifying nationalist sentiment by bringing members of diverse and 
geographically dispersed communities into close physical contact (Reissman 1970). This may 
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have the effect of attenuating inter-communal tensions by cultivating personal friendships, 
intermarriages and economic interdependences between groups. For example, Green (2013) 
shows that urbanisation has had a statistically significant negative effect on ethnic diversity in 
Africa, and ethnic diversity is often cited as a structural factor that may increase the likelihood 
of conflict or clashes (e.g. ethnic riots) between groups. 
An increase in the proportion of a population living in urban areas could also affect the 
composition and behaviour of key political actors in ways that render protests less likely.  ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ   ǲȏustained] urbanization not only increases the number of 
slumdwellers, but it also expands and diversifies the middle class, bringing into existence new, 
more conservative middle- ǳ ȋ ? ? ?Ȍ          Ǥ 
other words, the first generation of urban middle classes may agitate in the streets, but the 
second is likely to have more to lose by doing so. Moreover, ǯ
living in urban areas increases it is rational for political elites in power to cater to urban 
preferences in order to a) build a broad base of constituents and/or b) mitigate the risk of 
outbreaks of urban unrest, which could undermine the authority or legitimacy of a ruling 
regime. The threat of urban unrest has been a concern for rulers since the birth of cities, hence 
the Ǯǯȋ
and Glaeser 1995; Wallace 2013; Anthony and Crenshaw 2014). In the contemporary era of at 
least nominally democratic mass politics in Africa, the ratio of urban dwellers may well factor 
into the political calculus of incumbent elites or their opponents. A study of urban political 
attitudes in Africa by Harding (2010) offers some indirect support for this hypothesis. Using 
Afrobarometer data, Harding found that urbanites in Africa generally have a more negative view 
of incumbent political parties than their rural counterparts, but this bias appears to be inversely 
correlated with the percentage of the population living in urban areas, suggesting that 
urbanisation has a    ǯ     Ǥ
Harding speculates that politicians shift their platforms in favour of urban voters as these voters 
become increasingly (quantitatively) important constituencies. 
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Empirical evidence on the relationship between levels of urbanisation and protest activity is 
very thin as the majority of existing studies do not actually directly test this relationship. There 
are three studies that provide some evidence of a positive relationship between ǯ
of urbanisation and social unrest (see Walton and Ragin 1990; Glaeser and DiPasquale 1998; 
Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). However, the estimation strategies employed in the first two of 
these studies are questionably simple (both employ tobit models and exclude key political and 
economic variables), and in all three cases the authors fail to control for urban population size, 
creating ambiguity in the interpretation of the Ǯǯcoefficient. This is evident in the 
results of a recent study by Anthony and Crenshaw (2014), which finds a U-shaped association 
between levels of urbanisation and anti-government demonstrations when controlling for 
national populationȄa close proxy for urban population. This finding suggests that the 
frequency of such demonstrations decreases with urbanisation up to a point, and then increases 
at higher levels. Finally, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) find that level of urbanization helps to 
predict major nonviolent uprisings but do not specify whether the association is positive or 
negative in their forecasting model.  
In sum, the potential effect of urbanization is theoretically ambiguous.  In general it is assumed 
that urbanization increases the likelihood of contentious collective action, but this assumption 
largely rests on urban population scale effects rather than ratio effects per se. In other words, 
past theorising on the topic has often conflated two distinct phenomena: the growth or urban 
populations in relative terms and the scale and growth of urban populations in absolute terms.  ǡ        Ǯǯ     
literature are better understood as population scale effects than population ratio effects per se. 
 
Urban Population and Scale Effects 
T  ǯ
population (and by extension the number of large cities in a country) to have a positive and 
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significant effect on the frequency of certain kinds of contentious collective action. From a 
resource mobilisation standpoint, urban population size directly determines the number of 
people in close proximity and potentially available to organise or participate in a collective 
action event. Absolute population size also and has a more direct potential effect on the 
probability of detection. The same consideration holds for hypothesised grievance mechanisms. 
The challenges of providing services, amenities and opportunities in an urban area are more 
directly linked to the absolute size of the population living in such areas than their share of the 
national population, and (potentially volatile) socio-cultural diversity is more likely to be 
correlated with population size than population ratios.  
Measures of urbanisation (as a ratio) only indirectly capture information about the scale of 
urban populations. For example, in a country of 50 million people with 20 percent living in 
urban areas there are 10 million potential protestors in in urban areas; in a country of 200 
million people and just 15 percent living in urban areas, there would be 30 million potential 
protestors living in close proximity. Given the hypothesised mechanisms linking urban 
population to contentious collective action, we would expect the latter, less-urbanised country 
to experience more frequent protests due to sheer scale effects.  ǡ           ǯ 
population exerts a significant positive effect on the frequency of protests in any given country 
and year by influencing the motives and means for protest mobilisation, as well as lowering the 
individual costs of participation. 
There is fairly robust evidence of such population scale effects. Population size has been shown 
to be correlated with various indicators of contentious collective action events at the national 
level (Hibbs 1973; Arce and Bellinger 2007; Collier and Rohner 2008; Anthony and Crenshaw 
2014), at the national urban level (Hibbs 1973; Kurtz 2004) and with outbreaks of violent 
conflict at the local level in Africa (Raleigh and Hegre 2009). Studies have also shown that larger 
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cities tend to have more contentious collective action events than smaller cities (Eisinger 1973; 
Urdal and Hoelscher 2012; Buhaug and Urdal 2013). 
Given the strong theoretical basis for expecting a positive relationship between the size of urban 
populations and the frequency of contentious collective action events, we expect measures of 
both urban population size and the number of large cities in a country to be positively and 
significantly correlated with protest frequency.  
 
Urban Population Growth and Rate-of-Change Effects 
Often when authors discuss links Ǯǯ unrest the implicit or explicit 
mechanism cited is social strain and intensification of resource competition due to rapid 
population growth in urban areas (e.g. Goldstone 2010; Buhaug and Urdal 2013). In other 
words, it is the rate of change in the urban population (rather than the ratio or size of urban 
populations), that serves as a source of potential grievance that may stimulate unrest. However, 
the few published studies  Ǯǯ
failed to find evidence of a significant correlation.  In an early quantitative study, Hibbs (1973) 
found no association between rates of urbanisation and an indicator of collective protest in a 
sample of 58 countries. Walton and Ragin (1990) found urban population growth to be 
negatively but insignificantly correlated with protest events in a study of austerity protests in 
developing countries in the 1980s. In a more recent study of political instability in Latin ǡ
ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǯ
significantly correlated with an index of political instability that includes demonstrations, riots 
and strikes. Most recently, Buhaug and Urdal (2013) find no evidence that population pressure 
in urban areas is associated with increased risk of urban social disorder events and some 
evidence of a negative association. The authors speculate that there may be an endogenous 
relationship between these variables: population pressure may be a source of grievance, but 
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civic disorder may also discourage or prevent people from moving to cities, thereby serving as a 
countervailing mechanism. 
While the failure to find clear empirical support for the demographic strain hypothesis may be 
due to an endogenous relationship, it could also be a consequence of the way in which this effect 
has been t Ǥ 	 ǡ  ǯ    ȋ  Ȍǡ
which is a measure of the rate of change in a ratio, does not contain explicit information on the 
actual scale of urban population change. Consequently, this variable does not directly reflect ǡǤǡǯ
growth could be very high, but the actual number of people added to urban areas comparatively 
modest. For example, in a country with an urban population of 1 million, a 5% increase in urban 
population size translates into an additional 50,000 people needing shelter, water, sanitation 
and employment. By contrast, in a country with an urban population of 70 million (such as 
Nigeria), an increase of 5% represents an additional 3.5 million urbanitesȄa profoundly more 
challenging situation. In the models presented below, we use urban growth as one measure of 
relative population pressure, but also introduce an alternative measure that explicitly accounts 
for the absolute size of urban population change to address this potential problem with 
previous empirical efforts.  
 
Urban Concentration and Distribution Effects 
Several recent studies have argued that urban primacy or a high degree of urban concentration 
also influences the frequency of contentious collective action events. Generally speaking, urban ǯȋȌ
city. Alternative measures of urban concentration (a more expansive concept) use a subset of 
the national urban population instead (e.g. the population of the largest city divided by sum of 
the population of the next four largest cities).   Anthony and Crenshaw (2014Ȍǲ
primacy promotes political mobilization via the concentration of national economic and political 
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ǳȋ ? ?Ȍǯ
mobilization due to the agglomeration of resources and grievances, and by creating a more 
favourable political opportunity structure for potential protesters. Similarly, Wallace (2014) 
argues that urban concentration increases the likelihood of contentious collective action events  ǲ ǡ    erent cities or rural areas, make ȏȐǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ?ȌǤ
Empirically, the evidence is inconclusive. Anthony and Crenshaw (2014) actually find a negative 
and significant correlation between a measure of urban primacy and the frequency of anti-
government demonstrations. However, the relationship appears to be curvilinear: the frequency 
of demonstrations increases at very high levels of primacy. By contrast, Wallace (2013) finds 
that the proportion of the urban population concentrated in the largest city is positively 
associated with the frequency of urban social disturbance events in a selection of African and 
Asian cities, and with the frequency of contentious collective action events catalogued in the 
Cross-National Time Series Archive of Arthur Banks (2011). Both Anthony and Crenshaw 
(2014) and Wallace (2014) also find a positive and significant correlation between the size of a ǯ  tion events and claim that 
this provides corroborating evidence of the primacy/urban concentration hypothesis.  
The inconsistency of results across studies is likely due to different models and somewhat 
dependent variables. Wallace (2013, 2014) only controls for GDP per capita and GDP growth.  
Such a parsimonious model is problematic given the potential for omitted variable bias. 
Anthony and Crenshaw provide a more complete model with controls for a range of 
demographic, economic and political variables, but clear inference is confounded by collinearity 
of explanatory variables.  
On further reflection the hypothesised relationships between primacy or urban concentration 
on the one hand and contentious collective action on the other essentially hinge on simple scale 
effects, which need to be accounted for in an empirical model. As noted above, larger cities are 
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likely to have more protests than smaller ones, and countries with larger urban populations in 
general are likely to experience more collective action events than demographically smaller Ǥǯǡǡǯ
the number of events overall will be higher than in an identical country with a more evenly 
distributed urban population. To illustrate the point, consider the four hypothetical countries in 
Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 Urban primacy and protest: a thought experiment 
 
Country A and Country B have identical urban populations of 5 million people but different 
degrees of primacy. In Country A 25 percent of the urban population is in the largest city and 
the remainder distributed across other urban centres; in Country B 50 percent are concentrated 
in the largest city. While Country B may experience more protests in the largest city than 
Country A, in the latter case there are more people spread across other towns and cities than in 
Country B, which raises the probability of events in those other urban centres. While the 
difference in population concentration may influence the geography of contentious collective 
action, it is not clear that it should affect the overall frequency of such events. This ambiguity 
regarding the significance of urban concentration on overall event frequency is further 
illustrated by Country C, which has a lower level of primacy than Country B but the same size 
primary city and many more people in other urban centres. This country is likely to experience 
more protests than Country B despite a much lower degree of urban concentration. Finally, 
Country D is roughly modelled on Nigeria, which has the second highest average number of 
protest events per annum in our dataset (after Egypt) and yet one of the lowest levels of urban 
concentration in Africa. As this thought experiment illustrates, once scale effects are factored 
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into the analysis, urban primacy or urban concentration is very unlikely to affect the overall 
probability of events in any given country.  
In sum, protests are more likely in large cities than small ones and may be even more likely in ȋǤǤȌǤǯ
distribution of urban populations will exert a highly significant effect on the overall frequency of 
contentious collective action events in a country.  
 Ǯ-ǯ 
One of the most consistent findings in empirical studies of contentious collective action is an 
inverse correlation between  ǯ   economic growth and the probability of 
contentious events ranging from full blown armed rebellions to urban demonstrations and riots 
(see Glaeser and DiPasquale 1998; Campos and Nugent 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Kurtz 
2004; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 2004; Arce and Bellinger 2007; Blattman and Miguel 
2010; Bohlken and Sergenti 2010; Urdal and Hoelscher 2012; Wallace 2013; Wallace 2014). The 
explanation for this is intuitive: robust growth is associated with favourable economic 
conditions at household level (hence reducing grievances) and increases the opportunity costs 
of engaging in contentious activities. It also generates more government revenues that can be 
used for (popular) public expenditure or bolstering resources for state security (in autocratic 
regimes). Conversely, low or negative growth decreases opportunity costs, intensifies social 
strain and may stimulate divisive political mobilization (Bohlken and Sergenti 2010), while    ǯ  to deliver services or repress dissent. However, the 
relationship between levels of economic development and contentious collective action is 
theoretically and empirically less clear.  
In the modernization school of thought there is a longstanding view that economic 
development, when viewed over the long run, is a socially and politically destabilising process 
(Huntington 1968; Hibbs 1973; Harms and Zink 2005; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). This view 
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is based on the theory that quantitative and qualitative shifts in economic output erode Ǯǯ   ǡ     
popular demands for the redistribution of wealth and political authority, particularly among 
emergent urban middle classes, which (contrary to popular perceptions) is far more likely to 
organize and participate in protest than the urban poor (Huntington 1968; Nelson 1979).  From 
a resource mobilisation point of view, rising income and the emergence of an organised urban 
workforce provide the means for effective collective action (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).  
Some empirical support for these arguments can be found in recent studies that have assessed 
the determinants of individual propensities to engage in protest. For example, in a study of self-
reported protest participation based on Afrobarometer data from 18 African countries Pilati 
(2011) found that educational attainment, employment and membership in a trade union, 
professional association or community development associationȄfactors associated with 
middle-class statusȄare all positively and significantly correlated with protest participation. In 
a similar study of protest participation in Latin America, Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ǡ    Ǯǯ    
with protest participation.  
However, from a grievance point of view, higher incomes might be expected to exert a negative 
effect on contentious collective action and there is clear evidence in studies of armed conflict 
that this is the case. Scores of studies have consistently demonstrated that income level and the 
incidence of armed conflict are negatively correlated (Blattman and Miguel 2010). But the 
evidence is less clear-cut in the case of other forms of contentious collective action. While 
Glaeser and DiPasquale (1998) report a negative and significant association between income 
and riots in a cross-country analysis, Collier and Rohner (2008) show a positive and significant 
correlation between GDP per capita on the one hand and demonstrations, riots and strikes on 
the other. Buhaug and Urdal (2013) show mixed results, with GDP per capita negatively and 
significantly associated with lethal urban social disturbance events but uncorrelated with non-
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lethal events, while Anthony and Crenshaw (2014) find a curvilinear relationship between 
income and anti-government demonstrations. Other studies have generally found no 
statistically significant correlation between income and the incidence of various forms of 
contentious collective action other than armed rebellions (Walton and Ragin 1990; Bratton and 
van de Walle 1997; Bohlken and Sergenti 2010; Cunningham and Lemke 2011; Urdal and 
Hoelscher 2012; Wallace 2014).  
The lack of a clear correlation may be due to a tendency to conflate different types of 
contentious collective action events into a single dependent variable. For example, the most 
popular dataset of contentious events other than civil wars has been the Banks (2011) data, and 
many authors combine the reported number of strikes, demonstrations, riots, coups, 
assassinations, purges, government crises, revolutions and anti-government demonstrations. 
Similarly, the urban social disorder dataset employed by Urdal and Hoelscher (2012) and 
Buhaug and Urdal (2013) combines events such as demonstrations, riots, terrorist attacks and 
armed conflict. We hypothesise that the relationship between levels of income and contentious 
collective action is contingent on both the type of action and level of economic development. 
Where participation involves a sustained commitment to organised violence (e.g. armed 
rebellion), income is negatively correlated with the incidence of such events. By contrast, where 
participation is spontaneous and the probable level of violence is less than lethal, we expect 
income to exert a positive effect at low levels of development (through the resource 
mobilization channel) but taper off at higher levels of development, as accumulated wealth 
attenuates grievances and raises the opportunity costs of taking to the streets.  
We are also interested in a hypothesised interaction effect between levels of urbanisation and 
levels of economic development on the incidence of protest mobilisation. Put simply, it has long 
been argued that increases in urbanization without commensurate economic development Ȃ or Ǯ-ǯ Ȃ creates a uniquely volatile situation that raises the likelihood of 
contentious political mobilisation and instability (Huntington 1968; Goldstone 2002). However, 
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we found no direct test of this hypothesis in the published quantitative empirical literature. We 
therefore explicitly test this theory in our empirical analysis below.  
 
Political Institutions and Processes 
In our core models we include a suite of variables to capture the influence of political 
institutions and processes, which play a pivotal role in shaping the opportunities and motives 
for contentious collective action. In countries with autocratic regimes, where popular 
participation in political affairs and open competition for political office are not permitted, 
protests are likely to be rare given the lack of organizations available to mobilise interest groups 
and the high opportunity costs facing potential participants (e.g. imprisonment, torture or 
death).  By contrast,  Ǯ  ǯ      
democratic countries where civil society organizations are allowed to operate independently, 
political competition is permitted, and free speech is protected (Tilly and Tarrow 2007; 
Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). All other things equal, democracies are therefore likely to be 
more prone to protests than autocracies. There is some evidence to support this proposition: in 
cross-country quantitative studies Glaeser and DiPasquale (1998) found that dictatorships 
experience fewer riots than non-dictatorships, while Collier and Rohner (2008) show that 
democracies generally have more demonstrations, riots and strikes than non-democracies, but 
that wealthier democracies have fewer protests than poorer ones. 
There are, however, a diverse range of political regime types that exist in the space between 
archetypal autocracies and democracies. Nearly all countries in sub-Saharan Africa fall     ǡ   Ǯǯ   these regimes can provide 
motivation for collective mobilisation. In countries with nascent democratic institutions, which 
are not yet perceived to be wholly legitimate, the mismatch between public expectations and 
the actual performance of de jure institutions may drive citizens into the street (Machado, 
Scartascini and Tomassi 2011; Pilati 2011). Consequently, countries with hybrid regimes are 
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       Ǯǯ    
democracies, and the existing evidence supports this proposition. Cunningham and Lemke 
(2011) find evidence that hybrid regimes have a higher risk of riots than strong democracies 
and strong autocracies; Urdal and Hoelscher (2012) show a similar result with urban social 
disturbance events; and complimentary studies of demonstrations and riots in Latin America by 
Kurtz (2004) and Arce and Bellinger (2007) show that hybrid democracies are more prone to 
unrest than fully institutionalised ones. This inverted-U has even been demonstrated at the city 
level. In a study of protest events in American cities in 1968, Eisinger (1973) found that protest ǲ    ǳ ȋ ? ?Ȍ   perceived access to city councillors and 
executives. 
Political opportunity structures are also shaped by process and events that increase the 
possibility and potential returns of collective mobilisation at particular moments in time. 
Elections provide important focal points for political contestation and mobilisation, particularly 
in weakly institutionalised democracies where the legitimacy of electoral processes and 
outcomes are contested (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). Similarly, during periods of political ǡ   Ǯ   ǯ       
architecture of authority and the terms of political competition are in flux, collective 
mobilisation can be used as a tactic to influence decision makers or signal public preferences 
(ibid).  We control for both election effects and political regime instability in our empirical 
models below. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Dependent variable 
A protest can broadly be defined as an expression of dissent or discontent. For the purposes of 
the present investigation a protest is defined more narrowly as a public demonstration, riot or 
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strike. The empirical data on urban protest events used in this chapter were derived from the 
Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) (see Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). The SCAD database, 
which covers all African countries with a population of 1 million or more over the years 1990-
2013, contains information on a variety of event types, including demonstrations, riots, strikes, 
inter-communal conflict, government viǡǮǯǤ
from Associated Press and Agence France Press wires using Lexis-Nexis. The database contains 
information on the date, magnitude and location of each event. Utilising the event type 
information we created a dataset that includes a measure of protest incidence consisting of the 
sum of all demonstrations, riots and strikes (etype 1-6). Demonstrations are defined as generally 
peaceful actions; riots involve intentional physical injury or damage to property; strikes involve 
the partial or complete abandonment of workplaces by those belonging to an organization or 
union. Models were additionally run with demonstrations, riots and strikes as separate 
dependent variables in separate models with similar results, which are available on request. 
The dataset covers 46 countries between 1990 and 2013 and includes a total of 1128 country-
year observations. Observations for Eritrea begin in 1993 when the country became 
independent. Somalia and South Sudan have been excluded from the sample due to lack of 
socioeconomic data. Models incorporating Freedom of the Press scores only include data from 
1993. There are some other country-year observations with missing data points resulting in a 
slightly reduced sample size in some specifications. Descriptive statistics are provided in the 
appendix. 
An important concern with data derived from media outlets is that there may be a systematic 
bias in coverage associated with press freedom and resources. To some extent these concerns 
are mitigated by the fact that a) the events investigated here are public, collective and generally 
occurring in urban areas and therefore difficult to hide from foreign correspondents, b) the 
sources are international news wires, which are less susceptible to censorship than domestic 
news outlets, and c) wire services offer greater geographical coverage and face fewer space 
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constraints than newspapers, which are also used to produce event datasets of this kind 
(Salehyan et al. 2012). Indeed, comparisons of the SCAD dataset with that of Banks (2011), 
which has been the most commonly employed source of data on protests for quantitative 
studies, clearly indicates more comprehensive event coding in the former (Salehyan et al. 2012). 
Nevertheless, we empirically address the potential for bias in our core models by incorporating 
a measure of press freedom in our models derived from the Freedom House (2015) Freedom of 
the Press database. This provides an index of press freedom for each country and year based on 
an annual survey of print, broadcast and internet freedom. Values range from 0-100, with 
higher numbers representing lower degrees of freedom. To simplify the visual interpretation of           ǯ    ? ? ?  
higher values represent greater levels of press freedom (0=not free; 100=completely free). The 
series begins in 1993. 
It should be noted that there is an alternative and popular dataset available for measuring 
protest/riot events in the Africa: the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED). 
However, this dataset has two disadvantages for our purposes. First, in episodes where 
governmen    ǡ      Ǯ  ǯ
rather than a protest, which confuses matters. Second, and more importantly, in the ACLED 
database every day of a protest/riot is coded as a separate event. For example, a demonstration 
that begins on a Monday and ends on a Friday is coded as five separate events. In contrast, this 
would be coded as a single event in the SCAD database. As we are substantively interested in the 
frequency with which people mobilise, rather than for how long, the SCAD dataset was deemed 
more appropriate.   
 
Explanatory Variables 
Most of our core demographic variables are derived from UN Population Division estimates (see 
United Nations 2014). These include the natural log of the urban population (Ln urban 
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population) and the log of level of urbanisation (Ln urbanisation) for each country-year. In some 
models we also incorporate the size of the population in the largest city (Ln pop. Largest city) 
and number of large cities (N big cities - i.e. those with a population of 300,000+). Logged values 
of population variables are used to account for non-normal distributions. Our measure of urban 
primacy was calculated as the percentage of the total urban population living the largest city 
from UN data. In some casesȄparticularly for the smallest countriesȄUN estimates were 
unavailable for individual settlements and supplementary data were used from Thomas ǯ    ȋǤȌǤ      
population change we use two separate measures: the average annual rate of change in the size 
of the urban population (デ urban pop) and the natural log of the absolute increase in the 
number of people living in urban areas (Urban pop growth). We introduce this latter measure to 
compensate of the fact that デ urban pop only captures the rate of urban population change, not 
the scale of such change, which we would expect to be the more significant factor. We have 
excluded total national population due to its exact collinearity with urban population size and 
urbanisation. Including it would therefore obscure our ability to empirically distinguish 
between the urban population scale and ratio effects that we are interested in.  
In our core models we also include a vector of political variables to control for the influence of 
institutional conditions and political processes linked to protest. The first is an indicator of the 
number of national elections (i.e. presidential, parliamentary or constitutional referenda) for 
each country-year (N elections) taken from Nunley (2013). The second is a measure of the depth 
of democratic institutions drawn from the Polity IV dataset. We use the Democracy score (a 
subcomponent of the overall Polity score) for each country-year. This is a composite indicator 
combining measures of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive for each 
country and year. The indicator takes values between 0 and 10, with 0 representing no 
democratic characteristics and 10 representing strong democratic institutions. Given that the 
literature also indicates a non-linear (i.e. an inverted-U) shaped relationship between 
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     ǡ  Ǯǯ    
contentious collective action, we also include a Democracy2 term in our models. Finally, we 
include a dummy variable to capture the potential effects of political instability on protest. This 
variable, Regime change, takes a value of 1 if a country experienced a polity score change of 3-
points or more in that year. The vast majority of regime changes recorded in the dataset are 
positive. 
To reduce the prospect of bias due to reverse causality the Democracy and Democracy2 variables 
are lagged by one year. With regard to elections and Regime change, the expected influence is 
contemporaneousȄi.e. the holding of an election or a significant change in political institutions 
may create motives for protest before, during and after such events as groups seek to influence 
outcomes. As a result, these variables are not lagged, which renders clear identification of the 
direction of causality more difficult. We tested our core models with lagged values of both 
variables to ensure the robustness of our other findings. These models can be found in the 
online data appendix. 
For economic controls we include GDP per capita (log transformed) and GDP growth for each 
country-year. Both indicators are drawn from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
database and are measured in constant 2011 international dollars adjusted for purchasing 
power parity.  
Finally, in our core models we include a dummy variable for North Africa to account for the 
substantial historical, political and economic differences between countries on either side of the 
Sahara, as well as an Arab Spring dummy to capture the effects of the unique sequence of events 
that led to a dramatic increase in protest activity in the region after 2010. This latter variable 
takes a value of 1 for all North African countries from the year 2010. Year dummy variables for 
all countries were also included to account for changes that were the result of unobserved 
global or continental shifts that affected all countries equally. 
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In addition to these variables, we also tested the robustness of our results to the inclusion of a 
number of other control variables: the proportion of the country under 25, inequality 
(measured by Gini coefficient), ethnic polarisation and fractionalisation (between countries 
only), ethnic exclusion and ethnic minority dominance (using data from the Ethnic Power 
Relations dataset of Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009)), mortality, manufacturing as a 
percentage of GDP, and industry as a percentage of GDP. None of these changed our substantive 
result. We therefore excluded these from the analysis because missing data for these variables 
significantly reduced sample sizes. 
 
Model Estimation 
Our explanatory variables are incorporated into a series of negative binomial models with 
country random effects, and specified using the within-between formulation suggested by Bell 
and Jones (2015).  A negative binomial model is the most appropriate estimation strategy given 
the skewed and highly dispersed distribution of the protest data and has become the standard 
estimation strategy for analyses of similar event datasets (see Kurtz 2004; Shatzman 2005; Arce   ? ? ? ?Ǣ  ? ? ? ?Ǣǯ   ? ? ? ?Ǣ
2012). The general form of our core model can be written as: 
 
 
Here,  is the number of protest events in year t and country i, which is assumed to 
have a negative binomial distribution with an underlying rate of .   is a series of k 
covariates, representing various demographic, political and economic characteristics of country 
i on occasion t. The effects of these variables are divided into 'within' effects ( ), where only 
the within-country variation is considered, and 'between' effects ( ) which only consider 
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differences between countries.  is a series of country random effects, where , with 
 being estimated.  is a series of year dummy variables. The variance of  that is not 
accounted for by the variables in the model is equal to , where r is an 
overdispersion parameter that is estimated. The use of the negative binomial link function is 
appropriate when modelling counts (in this case, of protest events) where the data may be 
overdispersed; if r is found to be statistically significant, it suggests that the use of the simpler 
Poisson model would be inappropriate. 
The use of a random effects (RE) model may seem a controversial choice, given its perceived 
inability to control for unobserved country level factors when compared to the more often used 
fixed effects (FE) approach. However there are both technical and substantive reasons for 
making this choice. First, for negative binomial models, there is no conditional maximum 
likelihood estimation method that fully accounts for unobserved country effects (Allison and 
Waterman 2002; Allison 2009, 2012; Greene 2007; Guimarães 2008). Second, the dividing of 
parameters into within and between effects in a RE model means that the within effects will be 
equivalent to fixed effects estimates, because the higher level has been apportioned out into the 
between effect (Allison 2009; Bell and Jones 2015). Within effects represent the effect of an 
unusually high (or low) level of X for a given country, whilst the between effect represents the 
effect of a country generally having a high (or low) level of X. Whilst often the interest is 
primarily in the within effect (this is closer to the 'causal' effect of a change in X, although this 
interpretation is problematic in the presence of omitted time-varying variables), the between 
effect can also reveal interesting associations that operate at the country level and that can be 
very different from their time varying counterparts. A FE approach would not be able to 
uncover these between-country associations, because any country-level variation in the 
dependent variable is conditioned out. Whilst it would tell us how changes in demographic and 
democratic characteristics within countries affects protest incidence, it would tell us nothing 
about how those characteristics lead to differences between countries in protest incidence. Of 
course, care should be taken in interpreting either within or between effects as causal, since 
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both could be subject to bias due to reverse causality or omitted variables. The models were 
estimated in Stata using the xtnbreg command. Code to replicate the study can be found in this ǯǤ 
 
RESULTS 
Tables 2-4 summarise our key empirical results. We begin in Table 2 by examining the links 
between urban primacy and protest mobilisation as we expect this dimension of urban 
geography to have no substantive effect on national trends once other demographic variables 
are incorporated into the model. In these models we use the sum of protest events for each 
country over a five year period as the dependent variable as primacy data are only available in 
5-year intervals. While this yields only 4 observations per country we prefer fewer observations 
over an artificially inflated dataset employing interpolated values, which can bias results. In 
column 1 we present the most parsimonious model mirroring Wallace (2013). In contrast to his 
results we find no effect within countries and a negative and significant effect between 
countries. However, once we control for level of urbanization and urban population size 
(column 2) the effects disappears entirely. Column 3 incorporates a squared primacy term and 
the natural log of the population living in the largest city, following Anthony and Crenshaw 
(2014), and returns a similar non-result. Indeed, we tested a wide variety of models and found 
primacy to be consistently insignificant once basic demographic controls were introduced. We 
therefore have excluded the primacy variable from the remainder of the models presented here. 
This non-result is consistent with our theoretical expectations: if primacy influences the 
frequency of protest mobilisation, the effect is marginal at best and very possibly a statistical 
artefact of omitted variables bias. 
 
TABLE 2. Urban primacy and protest incidence 
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In Table 3 we introduce our core model and test the remainder of our urban geography 
variables with political and economic controls. In these models the dependent variable is the 
number of protest events in each country-year (rather than a 5-year summary). This annual 
approach allows us to control more precisely for volatile political and economic conditions than 
is possible with the five-year summary DV presented in Table 2.  The model in column 1 of 
Table 3 reveals a counterintuitive resultǣ  ǯ      
significantly correlated with the frequency of protest mobilization. This finding proved highly 
robust across the wide range of specifications that we tested and directly contradicts the 
conventional view that urbanization in developing countries increases the risks of protests.  
However, we find that urban population size is positively and significantly correlated with 
protest incidence between countries, but not within countries, and this result is similarly robust 
across a wide range of specifications. As an alternative test of scale effects we introduce the 
number of large cities as an explanatory variable in column 2 and find a similar positive and 
significant result.  
Taken together, these results indicate      ǯ   
relative terms has a mitigating effect on protest frequency, and that countries with larger-than-
average urban populations have more protests. However, it is not clear whether or not an 
increase in urban populations within a country raises the likelihood of protest mobilisation. This 
may in part be because of the high degree of auto-correlation between urban population and 
urbanisation at the within-country level (see appendix table A5). We suspect that a substantial       ǯ         
increase the likelihood of protest mobilization, but from year-to-year, or even over five year 
periods, changes in urban growth appear to have no substantive effect. 
 
TABLE 3. Urban geography and protest incidence: core models 
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This hypothesis finds some support in the results presented in columns 3-5, which examine the 
association between urban population change and protest incidence. In columns 3 and 4 we use 
the standard measure of the percentage change in the size of the urban population; in column 5 
we use the log of the absolute increase in the size of the urban population. The hypothesis that 
urban population growth may stoke civil unrest is not supported: we find a negative and 
generally insignificant correlation between our two measures of urban growth and protest 
incidence. This is consistent with results reported by Blanco and Grier (2009) and Buhaug and 
Urdal (2013) and may reflect reverse causality Ȃ i.e. people may not move to cities in periods of 
intense civil unrest. Given that the correlation is weak and highly susceptible to changes in our 
model specification we omit it from the remainder of the empirical analysis.  
Our political and economic controls are generally consistent with our expectations. Within 
countries, protests are more likely in election years and during episodes of regime instability. 
We also find a weakly positive and non-linear association between democracy and protest, 
which is consistent with the political opportunity structure theory of mobilisation and previous 
empirical research. The non-linear association between press freedom and protest within 
countries is more robust and warrants further research, as this is a unique finding.  GDP per 
capita is generally positively associated with protest incidence, which is consistent with 
resource mobilization theories, and GDP growth is generally negative, as expected. Finally, all 
other things equal, North African countries appear to have been significantly less likely to 
experience protest mobilization than those south of the Sahara (at least when the later, Arab 
Spring years are controlled for), and there is a clear Arab Spring effect.  
Table 4 builds on our baseline model (column 1 of Table 4) to explore interaction effects. We are       Ǯ-ǯ    by 
introducing interaction terms between GDP per capita and urban population variables, and 
alternatively interaction terms between a dummy variable that takes a variable of 1 for 
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ǮǯǤ The 
same political and economic controls reported in Table 4 are included in the models, however 
we do not report them in Table 5 in order to save space.  
 
TABLE 4.  Ǯ-ǯ 
 
The results show some evidence of a significant interaction between urbanisation and income, 
but these interactions are not large enough    Ǯ-ǯ Ǥ 
column 1 of table 5 we find a negative and significant association between our GDP per 
capita*Urbanization term and protest incidence, indicating that the within-country association 
between urbanisation and protest is more negative in richer countries. However this is not a 
strong enough effect size to reverse the directionality of the line Ȃ although less strong, low 
income countries are still (if anything) protected from protest incidents by higher levels of 
urbanisation. This is illustrated in figure 1 (which is based on the interaction in model 3). 
Although the apparent protective effect of urbanisation is smaller for low-income countries, it 
remains negative. If the over-urbanisation hypothesis were true, we would expect low income 
countries to experience more protests at higher levels of urbanisation, because they do not have 
concomitant growth to help deal with the problems that urbanisation poses. This does not 
appear to be the case. There is no evidence of any interactions between urban population size 
and GDP per capita. 
 
FIGURE 1.  Interaction effect: urbanisation, income level and protest incidence 
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CONCLUSION 
Countries with large urban populations experience more protests than those with small urban 
populations. However, this does not mean that urbanization contributes to civil unrest. In fact, ǣǡǯevel of 
urbanization is associated with a decrease in the probable number or protest events in any 
given year. Similarly, rapid urban population growth is negatively correlated with protest 
incidence, suggesting that urban population pressure is not a significant risk factor. We also find 
no robust evidence of a link between urban primacy and protest once appropriate demographic 
controls are introduced. 
These nuanced findings arise from an explicit recognition of the complexity of urban 
demographic processes. Separating population ratio, scale, rate-of-change and distribution 
effects provides a substantially more nuanced interpretation of the significance of urban 
population change in developing countries than that which emerges from vague theorising 
about t   ǮǯǤ      Ǥ   
distinguish between the related but distinct processes of urban growth and urbanisation has 
been particularly problematic in past research and arguably influenced flawed policies in Africa 
and other developing regions, such as disinvestment in cities and efforts to restrict rural-urban 
migration (see Fox 2014; Fox and Goodfellow 2016).  It is therefore important to be more 
careful about theorising and modelling urban demographic processes and their relationship to 
social and political phenomena of interest. 
Indeed, our results suggest that widespread concern about the disruptive consequences of rapid Ǯurbanizationǯ appear to be somewhat misplacedȄat least with regard to the likelihood of 
protest events such as demonstrations, riots and strikes. However, it is possible that urban 
demographic processes influence collective contentious action differentially along the spectrum 
of violence (e.g. effects on protest mobilization may differ from those on insurgency and civil 
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war)Ȅa possibility warranting further research. Finally, the conclusions drawn from a study 
such as this, where data are aggregated at the national level, need to be treated with caution. 
Further subnational research is needed to parse out substantive causal mechanismsȄresearch 
that has so far been constrained by the dearth of reliable, comparable subnational data in most 
developing countries. 
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TABLE 1. Urban primacy and protest: a thought experiment 
 Country A Country B Country C Country D 
Urban 
population 
5 million 5 million 10 million 70 million 
Primacy score 25% 50% 25% 15% 
Population in 
largest city 
1.25 million 2.5 million 2.5 million 10.5 million 
Residual urban 
population 
3.75 million 2.5 million 7.5 million 59.5 million 
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TABLE 2. Urban primacy and protest incidence 
 
Dep. Var. = 5-year sum of protest events per country, 1990-2010 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
within between within between within between 
Urban Primacy -0.0148 -0.0251*** -0.00632    -0.00535    -0.153 0.0236 
 
(0.0168) (0.00727) (0.0192)    (0.00696)    (0.163) (0.123) 
 
      
Urban Primacy2                             0.000688 -0.000394 
 
                            (0.00110) (0.000990) 
 
      
Ln Pop. Largest city                             3.535 0.0299 
 
                            (2.699) (1.654) 
 
      
Ln Urban Population   1.972*** 0.440*** -1.400 0.403 
   (0.422)    (0.0834)    (2.683) (1.664) 
       
Ln Urbanisation   -3.414*** -0.491*   -3.651*** -0.380 
 
  (0.779)    (0.255)    (0.791) (0.271) 
       
Ln GDP per capita 2.604 -1.065* 1.081    0.465    2.116 0.0898 
 
(1.893) (0.632) (1.981)    (0.833)    (2.064) (0.902) 
 
      
GDP growth 0.0171 -0.0877 0.000367    -0.120**  0.000537 -0.110** 
 
(0.0154) (0.0590) (0.0193)    (0.0497)    (0.0211) (0.0521) 
 
      
N 179 179 179 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 
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TABLE 3. Urban geography and protest incidence: core models 
 
Dependent variable = annual number of protest events per country, 1993-2013 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
within between within between within between within between within between 
Ln urbanisation -2.590** -0.564** -2.661** -0.386 -1.591** -0.228 -2.436* -0.740*** -2.812** -0.717*** 
 
(0.911) (0.217) (0.897) (0.220) (0.500) (0.264) (0.953) (0.224) (0.946) (0.217) 
           
Ln urban pop. 0.625 0.381*** 0.607 
   
0.761 0.395*** 0.803 0.807*** 
 
(0.644) (0.0615) (0.642) 
   
(0.660) (0.0599) (0.702) (0.241) 
       
N big cities 
   
0.145*** 
      
    
(0.0306) 
                 
Urban pop. growth 
    
-0.000577 -0.104 -0.0174 -0.154* 
  
     
(0.0321) (0.0834) (0.0366) (0.0683) 
              ? 
        
-0.133 -0.394 
         
(0.111) (0.225) 
           
N elections 0.0896* -1.314 0.0839* -0.937 0.0792* -1.420 0.0885* -1.115 0.0809* -0.949 
 
(0.0368) (0.726) (0.0369) (0.742) (0.0375) (0.812) (0.0365) (0.713) (0.0373) (0.717) 
           
Regime change 0.633*** 0.521 0.626*** 0.857 0.682*** 1.080 0.637*** 0.798 0.659*** 0.814 
 
(0.0849) (0.670) (0.0860) (0.670) (0.0838) (0.754) (0.0845) (0.656) (0.0850) (0.649) 
           
Democracyt-1 0.130** 0.0454 0.144** 0.0549 0.131* 0.0824 0.121* 0.0912 0.126* 0.0400 
 
(0.0493) (0.143) (0.0489) (0.149) (0.0508) (0.177) (0.0496) (0.140) (0.0498) (0.141) 
           
Democracy2t-1 -0.0107 -0.00675 -0.0120* -0.00875 -0.0112 -0.0102 -0.00989 -0.0174 -0.0102 -0.00874 
 
(0.00610) (0.0171) (0.00613) (0.0180) (0.00636) (0.0231) (0.00614) (0.0172) (0.00615) (0.0177) 
           
FOTP score 0.0358*** 0.0744* 0.0383*** 0.0694* 0.0360** 0.0568 0.0355*** 0.0617* 0.0451*** 0.0650* 
 
(0.0104) (0.0290) (0.0102) (0.0300) (0.0111) (0.0336) (0.0105) (0.0289) (0.0109) (0.0284) 
           
FOTP squared -.000686*** -.000767* -.000707*** -.000696* -.000676*** -.000561 -.00684*** -.000568 -.000790*** -.000616* 
 
(0.000133) (0.000316) (0.000134) (0.000326) (0.000137) (0.000375) (0.000133) (0.000322) (0.000136) (0.000314) 
           
Ln GDP per capita 2.320 1.542 1.513 0.901 2.282 0.658 2.562* 1.549 4.300** 1.636* 
 
(1.256) (0.839) (1.213) (0.856) (1.169) (0.990) (1.252) (0.808) (1.374) (0.805) 
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GDP growth 0.000293 -0.142* 0.00137 -0.103 0.000324 0.00368 -0.0000755 -0.138* 0.000970 -0.145* 
 
(0.00310) (0.0675) (0.00281) (0.0673) (0.00280) (0.0772) (0.00311) (0.0661) (0.00300) (0.0648) 
           
N. Africa dummy -0.776** 
 
-0.335 
 
-0.695* 
 
-0.929*** 
 
-0.812** 
 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.261) 
 
(0.300) 
 
(0.264) 
 
(0.258) 
            
Arab Spring 1.179*** 
 
1.222*** 
 
1.175*** 
 
1.261*** 
 
1.193*** 
 
 
(0.161) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.161) 
 
           Constant 0.273 
 
0.242 
 
0.318 
 
0.308 
 
0.253 
 
 
(0.212) 
 
(0.212) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.212) 
 
(0.215) 
            
N 957 
 
957 
 
957 
 
957 
 
930 
 Log Likelihood -2326.2 
 
-2331.0 
 
-2341.5 
 
-2323.8 
 
-2269.9 
 Note: Standard error in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 
39 
 
 
TABLE 4. Ǯ-ǯ 
 Dependent variable = annual number of protest events per country, 1993-2013 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
within between within between within between within between 
Ln Urbanisation 4.832 0.0974 -2.797*** -0.558** -4.499*** -0.356 -2.493*** -0.263    
 
(3.079) (1.551) (0.970) (0.217) (0.983) (0.303) (0.903)    (0.170)    
         
Ln urban pop. 0.0183 0.397*** 0.268 -0.280 0.0527 0.386*** 0.112    0.314*** 
 
(0.686) (0.0615) (0.991) (0.719) (0.644) (0.0626) (0.818)    (0.0709)    
         
Ln GDP per cap 16.21*** 3.147 -0.0882 -1.117 
  
                     
 
(5.663) (3.537) (4.980) (2.969) 
  
                     
         
GDPpc * Urbanisation -3.842** -0.381 
    
          
 
 
(1.527) (0.882) 
    
          
    
GDPpc * Urban Pop 
 
0.275 0.341 
  
          
 
   
(0.560) (0.373) 
  
          
          
Low Income dummy 
   
-0.0970 
 
-0.0728    
 
     
(0.136) 
 
(0.140)    
 
         
Low Income * Urbanisation 
  
3.116*** 0.155           
 
     
(0.878) (0.312)           
    
Low Income * Urban Pop 
    
0.580    0.124    
       
(0.378)    (0.0755)    
         
         
Constant 0.139 
 
0.297 
 
0.203 
 
0.294    
 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.215) 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.231)    
 
         
N 957 
 
957 
 
957 
 
957    
 Log Likelihood -2322.9 
 
-2325.7 
 
-2322.4 
 
-2325.6    
 Note: Standard error in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10. The political and economic controls reported in 
Table 4 were included in these models. They are omitted from this table to conserve space and are available on 
request. 
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FIGURE 1.  Interaction effect: urbanisation, income & protest 
 
 
 
 
